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Constitutional Law: Public Aid to Parochial
Schools Held Unconstitutional
In the spring of 1972, the New York Legislature enacted sev-
eral amendments to the state's Education and Tax Laws.1
These amendments provided maintenance and repair grants to
private schools with high concentrations of pupils from low-in-
come families, tuition reimbursements to low-income parents of
children attending private schools and tax relief to parents who
paid tuition to private schools but whose income made them
ineligible for tuition reimbursements. The Committee for Pub-
lic Education and Religious Liberty and several individual resi-
dents and taxpayers of New York sought to enjoin officials of
the State of New York2 from approving or paying any funds or
affording any tax benefits under the amendments on the ground
that the amendments violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment. A three-judge court in the Southern District
of New York held that the sections of the Act which provided for
maintenance and repair grants and tuition reimbursements were
unconstitutional but upheld the sections relating to tax relief.3
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court as
to the unconstitutionality of the maintenance and repair grants
and the tuition reimbursements but reversed as to the remain-
der, holding that the tax relief provisions had the primary ef-
fect of advancing religion and thus violated the establishment
clause. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
1. N.Y. LAws 1972, ch. 414, §§ 1-5, amending N.Y. EDuc. LAw
art. 12, §§ 549-53; art. 12-A, §§ 559-63; and N.Y. TAx LAw §§ 612(c),(j)
(McKinney Supp. 1972).
2. The Commissioner of Education, the Comptroller and the Com-
missioner of Taxation and Finance. Parents of children attending non-
public schools were allowed to intervene as defendants, as was the Ma-jority Leader of the New York State Senate. Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
3. Id. at 655. The court decided the case without an eviden-
tiary hearing, the judgment being rendered as to the constitutionality
of each provision on its face. Judge Hays dissented from that portion
of the cours opinion which held the tax relief constitutional. Id. at
674.
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In August, 1971, the Pennsylvania General Assembly en-
acted the Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic Education 4
which provided for partial reimbursement of tuition paid by
parents of children attending nonpublic schools. Residents and
taxpayers of Pennsylvania challenged the law as violative of the
establishment clause and sought to enjoin its enforcement. A
three-judge district court held that the law was unconstitutional
and granted a motion for summary judgment.0 On appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the primary effect of the
law would be the advancement of religion. 7 Sloan v. Lemon,
413 U.S. 825 (1973).8
The constitutional basis underlying the separation of church
and state rests in the first amendment's provision that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The objective of
these clauses has been said to be the avoidance of both religious
domination or interference with politics and political domina-
tion or interference with religion.10 Their goals have also been
characterized as voluntarism in matters of religion, mutual ab-
stention of the political and religious caretakers, and govern-
4. 24 PA. STAT. § 5701-09 (1972).
5. The initial defendant was the State Treasurer of Pennsylvania.
Several parents who had children attending nonpublic schools and were
therefore entitled to receive reimbursements under the Act were allowed
to intervene as defendants. Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356, 1358
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
6. Id.
7. The supporters of the Act had also presented an equal protec-
tion argument based on the theory that the sections relating to attend-
ance at non-sectarian private schools were severable from those dealing
with sectarian schools, permitting aid to the former and therefore violat-
ing the fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected the severability
claim and described the remainder of the argument as spurious. Once
the provisions have been held to violate the establishment clause, the
inquiry is ended; the equal protection clause cannot be used to justify
ignoring other constitutional provisions. 413 U.S. 825, 833-35.
8. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in both cases. Chief
Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in both Nyquist and Sloan
in which Justice Rehnquist joined and Justice White joined in part, 413
U.S. 756, 798. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent to Nyquist in which
he was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, Id. at 805.
Justice White wrote an opinion dissenting to both cases in which he
was joined in part by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, Id.
at 813.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Jefferson described the establishment
and free exercise clauses as erecting a "wall of separation" between
church and state. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164, cited in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
10. See generally L. PrnFFm, CHURcH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1967).
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mental neutrality towards religion and among religions."
In many cases, some of these goals will conflict. In addi-
tion, a tension exists between the free exercise clause and the
establishment clause if either is extended to its limit. These dif-
ficulties have led the Court to confess that it "can only dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensi-
tive area of constitutional law."'12 Nevertheless, in applying the
religion clauses to the cases which have come before it, the
Court has developed a three-part test for determining if a chal-
lenged.enactment is constitutional. First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose.13 Second, the law's principal or
primary effect must not be the advancement (or inhibition) of re-
ligion.14 Finally, the statute must not foster an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.15
The question of aid to parochial schools has plagued the
Court for a number of years. In Everson v. Board of Educa,-
tion,16 the Court upheld a New Jersey statute providing for
reimbursement to parents of bus fares paid for transportation
to and from both public schools and private, church-related
schools. The Court admitted that this might provide some in-
ducement for parents to send their children to private schools
but noted that the law had a secular purpose (safety of the chil-
dren), that no state funds were used for any religious activity,
that the program was a general one not limited to parochial
school children' 7 and that the payments went to the parents
11. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. Rlv. 1680,
1684 (1969). Voluntarism means simply that there should be no coer-
cion toward or away from religion. As Justice Douglas wrote in Zorach
v. Clauson, each religious group should be allowed to "flourish accord-
ing to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma." 343 U.S.
306, 313 (1952). Mutual abstention expresses the philosophy that reli-
gion should be kept out of politics and politics should be kept out of
religion. Governmental neutrality, in general, means that government
will not favor one religion over another nor will it favor religion over
non-religion. With the expanded role of government in the social order
and in the lives of individuals, it is not always clear whether neutrality
is best served by governmental inaction or by action which carefully
avoids favoring any one group or idea.
12. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
13. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
14. Id.
15. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
16. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
17. The Court stated in Everson that the state could have chosen
to pay only for the transportation of public school students. 330 U.S.
1, 16. However, such an arrangement could constitute a denial of equal
protection. A recent West Virginia Supreme Court case held just that.
1974]
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rather than the school. Likewise, in Board of Education v. Al-
len,18 the Court upheld a program of government loans of text-
books to parochial school students. While it was admitted that
the schools would receive some benefit, the restriction of the
program to purely secular textbooks was held to prevent it from
impermissibly aiding religion.
However, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 the Court ruled uncon-
stitutional a Rhode Island program consisting of salary supple-
ments for teachers of certain secular subjects and a Pennsyl-
vania program of direct subsidy to private schools, covering
their outlays for teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional
materials in secular courses. Both programs contained fea-
tures requiring supervision to insure that the funds supplied
would be used only for secular purposes. Each was struck down
on the ground that it would tend to cause excessive government
entanglement with religion because of the need for continuing
supervision and because of the expected political battles over
the amount of aid to be given.
In Tilton v. Richardson,20 decided the same day as Kurtzman,
the Court upheld a program of federal grants to colleges, includ-
ing sectarian schools, for the purpose of constructing secular
classrooms. The differences between college education and pri-
mary and secondary education (the greater freedom to question
and the lack of religious indoctrination at the college level) were
stressed in the decision, as was the restriction of the buildings to
secular uses.
Walz v. Tax Commission,2 1 though not dealing with educa-
tion, was also a significant precedent in the first amendment
area. In that case, the Court upheld the traditional tax-exempt
status of churches, emphasizing the long history of the exemp-
tion, the broad class of institutions which received such exemp-
tions and the indirect nature of the benefit.
The legislation at issue in Nyquist and Sloan was designed
in the hope of satisfying the tests the Court had imposed in its
Hughes v. Board of Educ., - W. Va. -, 174 S.E.2d 711 (1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 944 (1971).
18. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
20. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
21. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). For a more thorough discussion of Walz,
see Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 69 MicH. L. Rnv. 179 (1970); and Note, Constitution-
ality of State Property Tax Exemptions for Religious Property, 66 Nw.
U.L. REv. 118 (1971).
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earlier decisions. For example, the only funds in either scheme
which went directly to the schools were the New York main-
tenance and repair grants, and those funded a special program
restricted to schools which educated primarily low-income chil-
dren. All other aid was indirect, going to the parents of paro-
chial school students rather than to the schools. This feature
was probably designed in the hope that the Court would accept
the "child-benefit" theory, which argues that aid given to the
child or the parents (as in Everson and Allen) benefits them
rather than the religious institution.22 In addition, much of the
aid to parents in New York was given in the form of tax relief,
probably in the anticipation that it would be sustained by reason
of its similarity to the tax exemptions upheld in Walz.
In applying its three-part test of purpose, effect and en-
tanglement to Nyquist and Sloan, the Court began by conced-
ing that the purpose of the aid programs was secular. The
states' interests in maintaining a healthy and safe environment
for school children, in promoting pluralism and diversity, and
in protecting already overburdened public school systems from
a sudden influx of pupils were all held to be both legitimate and
secular purposes.23 The entanglement issue was not reached in
either case because each aid provision was invalidated on the
ground that its primary effect would have been the advance-
ment of religion.
The Court's analysis of the New York maintenance and
repair grants focused on the absence of restrictions on the use of
the money. The grants could have been applied to maintain fa-
cilities used for religious activities as well as those used only
for secular activities. The Court distinguished Everson, Allen
and Tilton, where financial aid had been upheld on the ground
that the assistance in those cases went to the secular function
of the school and the only benefit conferred upon the religious
function was indirect (some parents might be encouraged to send
their children to the religious school). In response, the state
22. The child-benefit theory has been widely discussed as a means
of justifying aid to parochial schools. See, e.g., L. PFEFrmt, CHICH,
STATE AND FR DO , 555-62 (1967); Areen, Public Aid to Nonpublic
Schools: A Breach of the Sacred Wall? 22 CASE W. Rrs. L. Ery. 230,
248-53 (1971); Choper, Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. Rsv. 260
(1968).
On the other hand, the child-benefit theory has been sharply criti-
cized for placing form over substance. One writer has compared it to
the efforts by nineteenth century courts to classify pilotage laws as ei-
ther regulations of safety or regulations of commerce but not both. See
Freund, supra note 11, at 1682-83.
23. 413 U.S. 756, 773, 829-30 (1973).
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argued that since the grants could not exceed 50 percent of
comparable public school expenditures, there was, in effect, a
statistical guarantee that state money would not subsidize re-
ligion. This argument was based upon the assumption that an
amount at least equal to the maximum allowable grant would
be required for the purely secular functions of a school. In its
rejection of the state's argument, the Court stated that "a mere
statistical judgment will not suffice as a guarantee that state
funds will not be used to finance religious education. '2 4
The New York tuition reimbursement plan failed for the
same reasons as the maintenance and repair grants. The Court
began its analysis by pointing out that the tuition reimburse-
ment grants were unrestricted and thus would have been
clearly unconstitutional if given directly to the schools. The
only issue was whether giving them to the parents instead was a
constitutionally significant difference. In holding that it was
not, the Court emphasized that the grants were financial benefits
conferred only because of attendance at a nonpublic school. As
such, their effect was clearly to advance the religious purpose
of those schools, regardless of who actually received the grant.
The state advanced several other arguments in support of
tuition reimbursements, but the Court rejected each of them.
First, the state argued that the grant's reimbursement feature
was controlling: because the parent was free to use the money
as he or she saw fit, the parent would not be a mere conduit
carrying the money from the state to the parochial school. The
Court responded that it made no significant difference whether
the payments were made before or after the actual outlay for
tuition or where the actual tax dollars eventually came to rest.
Because the grant was a financial incentive for parents to send
their children to nonpublic schools, the label given to the pro-
gram was irrelevant. The state also advanced an argument
based upon a statistical guarantee of secular use similar to that
discussed by the Court in its analysis of the maintenance and
repair grants, and the Court rejected it for the same reasons.
Finally, the state argued that since tuition reimbursements were
granted only to low-income parents, their actual effect was to
promote the free exercise of religion by making it possible for
such parents to choose to send their children to religious
schools. The Court pointed to the inevitable tension between
the free exercise and establishment clauses and simply stated
24. Id. at 778.
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that this program crossed the line into the area of advancing
religion. The Pennsylvania program challenged in Sloan was
substantially the same as the New York tuition reimbursement
plan and was rejected for the same reasons.
New York's tax relief provisions were also voided because of
their primary effect. The Court examined the program and
found that it was not substantially different from the tuition
reimbursement plan:. in the latter, an actual cash payment was
made, while in the former, the amount that would otherwise
be owed to the state was reduced. As the dissenting judge be-
low had said: "In both instances the money involved represents
a charge made upon the state for the purpose of religious educa-
tion. ' 25 An attempt to apply the child-benefit theory to tax
relief was rejected for the same reasons it was rejected when
advanced in support of tuition reimbursement. The tax exemp-
tions granted in Walz were distinguished on three grounds: the
long history of such exemptions compared to the recent nature
of attempts to aid parochial schools, the broad class of institu-
tions which were exempt under the provisions upheld in Walz
compared with the almost exclusively religious character of the
schools benefited by the New York statute, and the fact that the
tax exemptions in Walz were upheld primarily because they
tended to prevent entanglement while the tax relief provisions
would encourage it.
In the two cases, three dissenting opinions were filed. Chief
Justice Burger agreed that the maintenance and repair grants
were unconstitutional but would have upheld the tuition reim-
bursement and tax relief schemes..2 6 His dissent was based on
the child-benefit theory, and he also relied on a case uphold-
ing government payments of Indian trust funds to sectarian
schools.2 7 Recognizing that the religion clauses can conflict, he
stated that "the balance between the policies of free exercise
and establishment of religion tips in favor of the former when
the legislation moves away from direct aid to religious institu-
tions and takes on the character of general aid to individual
families. '2 8 He also analogized the types of aid in question to
other governmental aid to individuals, such as "GI Bill" bene-
25. 350 F. Supp. 655, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
26. 413 U.S. 756, 805 (1973). Justice Rehnquist joined in Chief
Justice Burger's opinion. Justice White joined in it insofar as it related
to the tuition grants and tax relief provisions.
27. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), cited at 413 U.S. 756,
801 (1973).
28. 413 U.S. 756, 802 (1973).
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fits and Social Security payments, which may be used for any
purpose, including a religious purpose. Finally, he accused the
majority of judging the effect of the program by the number
of recipients choosing to use its benefits for religious purposes,
a factor which he believed irrelevant to the constitutional ques-
tion.
Justice Rehnquist also agreed with the majority's position
on the maintenance and repair grants but dissented from the re-
mainder of their opinion, 29 concentrating on Walz as a precedent
for upholding the tax relief provisions. In his opinion, there was
a qualitative difference between a direct subsidy and a plan of
tax relief since only the former involves a transfer of public
funds. The long history of tax exemptions cited in Walz should
not serve to distinguish that case from Nyquist, he argued, be-
cause the age or novelty of a scheme should not affect its con-
stitutionality. He believed that no matter how the New York
plan was characterized, it was still abstention from taxation and,
therefore, on the same theoretical footing as the tax exemption
upheld in Watz.
Justice White dissented ° in an opinion which focused on
the importance of parochial schools and which pointed out that
decisions concerning aid to parochial schools have a broad effect
on church-related education. His main thesis was that because
society is reaping a great benefit from nonpublic schools,81 both
from the reduction in the cost of operating the public schools
and from the diversity fostered by nonpublic schools, society
should alleviate the burden on parents who send their children
to such schools.
It is interesting to compare the analyses of the majority and
the dissenters in terms of voluntarism and neutrality, two of
the suggested policy goals for the religion clauses. 32  Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, examined the programs pri-
marily for their effect upon voluntarism; Chief Justice Burger,
29. Id. at 805. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined in
Justice Rehnquist's dissent.
30. Id. at 824. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined
in Justice White's opinion insofar as it related to the tuition reimburse-
ment and tax relief provisions.
31. Over five million elementary and secondary students were en-
rolled in nonpublic schools in 1972. In the large, industrial cities of
the North, 20 to 30 percent of the school-age population is often enrolled
in private schools. Such schools, however, have experienced a substan-
tial drop in enrollment which has been attributed primarily to the in-
creasing cost of nonpublic education. Id. at 814-18.
32. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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in dissent, focused more on a neutrality argument. Because the
majority and dissent started from different (though unstated)
policy bases, their arguments sometimes failed to directly clash.
What is apparent, however, is that a clear majority of the
Court 33 accepted Justice Powell's theoretical base of voluntarism
and rejected any distinction grounded solely upon whether
the benefit goes to an individual or to the religious school
This acceptance of voluntarism as the primary concern explains
the majority's emphasis on looking at the substance of the tui-
tion reimbursement plan.34 Regardless of whether the money is
given to the school or the parents, the majority viewed it as a
financial benefit contingent upon attendance at a nonpublic
school. All taxpayers are thus being forced to contribute to-
ward something which should be financed only by those believ-
ing in the religious mission of the school.
Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, compared the tui-
tion reimbursement with other types of aid which were ac-
cepted at least in part because of their neutrality. For exam-
ple, in Everso, the state had a general program of providing
bus transportation for students. The establishment clause did
not require that the state deny such general benefits to paro-
chial school students. It could be "benevolently neutral" in
providing the service, just as it is in providing churches with po-
lice and fire protection. Chief Justice Burger argued that the
states in Nyquist and Sloan were doing no more than avoiding
the hostility to religion which would exist in a policy which de-
nied the benefits of a state program of education to parents
whose religion impels them to send their children to church-re-
lated schools.
These decisions indicate that the future of aid to nonpublic
schools is not bright. The child-benefit theory has failed to win
the acceptance of a majority of the Court, as has the theory that
a tax benefit is inherently different from a direct subsidy.35
33. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and
Powell. 413 U.S. 756, 758 (1973).
34. As the majority said in Sloan:
[W]e look to the substance of the program, and no matter how
it is characterized its effect remains the same. The State has
singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic benefit
Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy,
as an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian
schools, or as a reward for having done so, at bottom its in-
tended consequence is to preserve and support religion-oriented
institutions.
413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973).
35. No justice chose to draw a constitutionally significant distinc-
1971]
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One point upon which the majority placed considerable em-
phasis, however, was the narrowness of the benefited class in
each case as compared to the broad benefited classes in Everson,
Allen and Walz. This analysis rests primarily on the neutral-
ity principle: if widespread benefits are conferred, they need
not be denied to churches. Hence, legislation benefiting a
class broader than just nonpublic, primarily Catholic schools will
probably be tried as a constitutional means of aiding parochial
schools. The breadth of the class 'benefited by such legislation
would be subject to very strict scrutiny, however.30
Another type of aid which might be acceptable is a shared-
time arrangement in which parochial school students are part-
time students in public school, receiving some of their secular
education there.3 7 Such a program might have to be held in
two separate buildings in order to avoid confusing the authority
of church and state, but it does have the advantage of provid-
ing distinctly secular benefit without much administrative en-
tanglement between church and state. Some form of tax bene-
fit may also be possible since the Court commented that it was
not ruling on several such benefits.
Since the program here does not have the elements of a genuine
tax deduction, such as for charitable contributions, we do not
have before us, and do not decide, whether that form of tax
benefit is constitutionally acceptable under the "neutrality" test
in Walz.5 8
Ingenious plans for aiding parochial schools have periodi-
cally reached the Supreme Court. It probably can be expected
that plans such as those discussed here and others will be de-
tion between the tuition reimbursement scheme and the tax relief pro-
visions. All justices either approved or disapproved of both.
36. A recent Ohio case struck down a program of tax benefits
which allowed the benefits not only to parents of nonpublic school stu-
dents but also to persons in home instruction programs, public adult
high school continuation programs, schools for tubercular persons, voca-
tional and basic literacy programs, persons who pay tuition at public
schools because they are nonresidents and persons who pay tuition at
public or private schools because they are deaf, blind, crippled, emo-
tionally disturbed, neurologically handicapped or mentally retarded.
However, the court noted that the largest of the groups other than non-
public school students consisted of only 20,000 members. Kosydar v.
Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd sub nom. Grit v. Wol-
man, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
37. See generally Comment, The Sacred Wall Revisited-The Con-
stitutionality of State Aid to Nonpublic Education Following Lemon v.
Kurtzman and Tilton v. Richardson, 67 Nw. U. L. Rsv. 118, 125-31
(1972).
38. 413 U.S. 756, 790 n.49 (1973).
[Vol. 58:657
1974] CASE COMMENTS 667
vised in the future. However, the possible scope of such plans
has been sharply narrowed by the Court's decision in Nyquist
and Sloan. Any plan which provides significant aid to paro-
chial schools will have to be ingenious indeed if it is to with-
stand the scrutiny of the establishment clause as presently in-
terpreted.
Indian Law: The Application of the One-man, One-vote
Standard of Baker v. Carr to Tribal Elections
Appellees, members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe,
sought an order enjoining a general tribal election and requir-
ing reapportionment of the elective districts of the Standing
Rock Indian Reservation. They alleged that since substantial
population variations existed among the districts, the districts
did not "fairly and accurately represent the population distri-
bution"1 of the reservation. The United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota issued a temporary restrain-
ing order enjoining the Tribal Council from holding the tribal
election. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, while reversing on the narrow ground that there was
no evidence in the record which actually showed that the dis-
tricts were misapportioned,2 held per curiam that the equal
protection clause in the Indian Civil Rights Act 3 included
1. White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1312 (8th Cir. 1973).
2. The court commented:
Reliance was had at trial upon figures of votes cast in the Sep-
tember 1971 election for Chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribal Council, submitted also in affidavit form to the District
Court, but the report reflects votes cast, not population figures,
and the correlation between the two was problematical at best.
While we recognize the intimation in the record of difficulty
in obtaining population figures for the tribe, nevertheless the
controlling factor, the sine qua non, in apportionment determi-
nations must be that of population, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 568 . . . (1964), as nearly as such may be determined in the
light of all available sources of information.
478 F.2d at 1315. See also Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658 (8th
Cir. 1973).
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1970). Section 1302 states:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise
of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized;(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself;(5) take any private property for a public use without just
compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right
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the one-man, one-vote standard first enunciated in Baker v.
Carr.4 White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.
1973).r
Although Congress has plenary power to legislate for In-
dian tribes and to govern Indians,G the federal courts have long
recognized the right of Indian tribes to control internal tribal
affairs.7 In light of this recognition, the courts have expressly
exempted tribal governments from any constitutional restraints
in their exercise of power over tribal members.8  However, in
to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have
assistance of counsel for his defense;(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict
cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event impose for
conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment
greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a
fine of $500, or both;(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or
property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable
by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury
of not less than six persons.
4. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). For a general discussion of the one-man,
one-vote standard see Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine
of Judicial Intervention and its Implications for American Federalism,
29 U. CH. L. REv. 673 (1962); McCloskey, The Reapportionment Case,
76 HAlv. L. Rnv. 54 (1962); Note, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Appor-
tionments: A Problem of Standards, 72 YA.E L.J. 968 (1963); Comment,
Challenges to Congressional Districting: After Baker v. Carr does Cole-
grove v. Green Endure?, 63 COLm. L. REv. 98 (1963).
5. The Tribal Council was required by the court to adopt a re-
apportionment plan consistent with the one-man, one-vote standard.
6. OFFICE OF TEE SoLIcrroR, U.S. DEPARTMIENT OF THE NTLmEoR, FE-
RAL INDi.x LAW 27 (1958) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INDLAN LAW].
Congress assumed its present role in Indian affairs in 1871, when it
ended treaty-making with the Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1964).
Thereafter, Indian affairs were no longer seen as quasi-international.
Statutory law and executive agreements replaced treaties, and Congress
assumed full control over the Indian tribes. FEDERAL INDIwA LAW, supra,
at 25 n.11.
7. The Indian tribes remained, in the words of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, "domestic dependent nations," whose control of tribal affairs re-
mained unextinguished, although subject to the superior power of the
United States. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet) 1, 17(1831), as discussed in Coulter, Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law:
The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 CoLum.
HusATA RiGas L. REV. 49, 52 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native Am.
Church of N. America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.
1959). Contra, Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965) (this
decision has not been followed).
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1968 Congress enacted an Indian Bill of Rights. Whereas
courts had been unwilling to find constitutional restrictions on
tribal power,'0 Congress imposed specific restraints on tribal
governments which consisted almost entirely of language ex-
cerpted from the United States Constitution." This use of
constitutional language has presented a serious problem of stat-
utory interpretation. It is not clear whether the use of consti-
tutional language requires modification of tribal governmental
procedures and laws to comply fully with the same constitu-
tional standards as they are imposed on state and federal gov-
ernments.
12
Although the federal government's Indian policy has his-
torically fluctuated widely between protection of tribal exist-
ence and assimilation, the legislative history of the Indian Bill
of Rights does not suggest that Congress intended to use the
statute as an instrument for altering tribal cultural attitudes
in order to facilitate the assimilation of Indians into the non-In-
dian community. In fact, the report of the committee investi-
gating the bill favored the preservation of tribal communities
as self-governing, culturally autonomous entities.18 The final
bill, as passed, contains explicit provisions implementing this
policy.'
4
9. For the relevant parts of the statute see note 3 supra.
10. See, e.g., Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir.
1971); Native Am. Church of N. America v. Navajo Tribal Council,
272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959).
11. The Indian Civil Rights Act incorporates guarantees found in
the United States Constitution with regard to certain basic liberties, in-
cluding due process, equal protection, free exercise of religion, freedom
of speech and safeguards during criminal proceedings. See note 3 supra.
12. See Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Sta-
tus of Indian Governments, 82 HARV. L. Rsv. 1343, 1345 (1969).
13. For example, the committee frequently asked witnesses during
the hearings whether the imposition of criminal procedural standards
would be too heavy a burden on the tribal courts. See, e.g., Hearings
on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 99, 147 (1962), 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4,
at 873-75 (1964). In McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629, 633 (D.
Utah 1973), the court stated:
[T]he Senate committee deleted restrictions contained in the
proposed statute upon the establishment of religion and the use
of racial voting classifications when it appeared that the first
restriction would undermine Indian theocracies and the second
would undermine tribal cultural autonomy generally.
14. The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a)
(1970), requires tribal consent for state assumption of criminal and civil
jurisdiction. In addition, § 1322 (c) stipulates that
[a]ny tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter
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The majority of federal court decisions since 1968 have con-
cluded that Congress intended to preserve the ethnic and cul-
tural autonomy of Indian tribes and have attempted to evolve
standards that will reconcile protection of fundamental individ-
ual rights as defined by Anglo-American experience with es-
sential tribal values. 15 In the context of tribal elections, the
courts have recognized that congressional exclusion of fifteenth
amendment guarantees of the right to vote was mandated by a
desire to protect the ethnic identity of Indian tribes from
charges of racial discrimination and to protect existing tribal
governmental structure from attacks designed to initiate an elec-
tion process where none existed. For example, in Groundhog
v. Keeler'16 the Tenth Circuit held that by Congress' express
exclusion of the provisions of the fifteenth amendment from
the Indian Civil Rights Act, "any basis of federal court jurisdic-
tion over tribal elections was definitely eliminated."1 7  How-
ever, that holding was limited in McCurdy v. Steele,'8 where
the district court found "no indication of congressional pur-
pose to allow tribal governments to ignore their own election
rules by exempting them from the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Indian Civil Rights Act.""'
The court in White Eagle used reasoning similar to that
employed in McCurdy when it concluded that since the Stand-
ing Rock Sioux Tribe "has established voting procedures pre-
adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exer-
cise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not incon-
sistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full
force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action
pursuant to this section.
15. See, e.g., Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278
(10th Cir. 1971); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971);
McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973), as discussed
in Note, Constitutional Rights of the American Tribal Indian, 51 VA.
L. REV. 121, 138 (1965). See also Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe of
S.D, 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972); Seneca Constitutional Rights Organi-
zation v. George, 348 F. Supp. 48 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Solomon v. LaRose,
335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1971); Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp.
370 (D. N. Mex. 1971); Lefthand v. Crow Tribal Council, 329 F. Supp.
728 (D. Mont. 197-1); Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp.
85 (D. Mont. 1969); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
16. 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971) (descendants of enrolled citizens
of the Cherokee Nation sought a judgment declaring that an appoint-
ment to the office of Principal Chief of the Tribe was illegal).
17. Id. at 682.
18. 353 . Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973) (plaintiffs sought to obtain
official recognition as the governing business council of the Confed-
erated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation).
19. Id. at 635.
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cisely paralleling those commonly found in our [Anglo-Ameri-
can] culture, '20 the principle of Baker v. Carr must be in-
corporated to secure "fair compliance with the tribe's own vot-
ing procedures."' 21  In so holding, the court apparently as-
sumed that since the tribal election laws resemble those of
Anglo-American culture to the extent that tribal officials are
elected to represent individual districts, the tribal laws must
also resemble Anglo-American election laws to the extent that
the one-man, one-vote standard of Anglo-American culture
can be assumed to be a part of the tribal law.
It is questionable, however, whether the court actually ob-
tained fair compliance with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe's
own voting procedures when it held that the tribe must com-
ply with the one-man, one-vote standard. The tribe's constitu-
tion both enumerated the voting districts whose validity was
questioned 22 and gave the Tribal Council, with the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior, the power "[t] o enlarge or dim-
inish the number of districts to meet future needs. '2 3  Al-
though the facts are silent on this point, the Tribal Council,
based on statutorily justifiable reasons, may have intended
to have voting districts of unequal population. For example,
tribes of different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds have been
grouped together for political and administrative purposes. 2
In these cases election districts can validly be apportioned on
an ethnic as distinctly opposed to a population basis. Thus the
court in White Eagle, far from merely enforcing existing tribal
election procedures, may have in fact created a new procedure,
even though such a task is normally performed by a legislative
body and not by the courts.25
There has been considerable speculation as to the effect
that the application of the one-man, one-vote standard to tribal
20. White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973).
See also McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629, 634 (D. Utah 1973).
21. 478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973).
22. STANDING RocK Sioux TRIBE CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIBE CONST. art. IV, § 1 (s).
24. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 459.
25. Reapportionment, although not a political question in the strict
Baker v. Carr sense of the term (i.e., "demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 216, 217 (1962)), is nevertheless primarily a matter for
legislative consideration. Federal courts usually do not intervene unless
the legislative body has failed to apportion in a timely fashion according
to law. In apportionment cases involving tribal governments, with the
additional considerations of cultural autonomy and separate values, the
courts should be even more reluctant to usurp this legislative function.
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elections would have on tribal governments.26 While the ap-
plication of the Baker v. Carr standard as espoused in White
Eagle will not impinge greatly upon tribal cultural autonomy
where the tribe purports to have a council elected by the peo-
ple from equal population districts, there may be situations in
which there has been significant and deliberate deviation
from the equal population standard..2 7  Since tribes are ethni-
cally distinct communities, courts should avoid using a rule of
presumptive illegality in determining the fairness of council
representation in such situations.28  In this regard, a deter-
mination of whether tribal remedies were exhausted should
have been a threshold consideration in White Eagle.29  Recent
case law has required that plaintiffs first exhaust all remedies
available within the tribal governmental framework before
seeking relief from the federal courts and has recognized that
a general exhaustion requirement would do much to strengthen
tribal governments by "aid [ing] the reservation Indian in main-
taining a distinct cultural identity."30  In the instant case, ini-
26. In fact, Congress did consider the effect of incorporating Baker
v. Carr into tribal elections. Marvin J. Sonosky, appearing on behalf of
tribes in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming, testified:
Reapportionment on the basis of one man, one vote would prob-
ably result in abolishing all districts and election of members
of governing bodies at large. I hesitate to forecast the disrup-
tive effects on stable tribal governments.
Hearings on S. 961-68 and S.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. oan Consti-
tutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong, 1st
Sess. 131 (1965). See also Reiblich, Indian Rights under the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 617, 632 (1968); Note, supra note 12, at
1360-61.
27. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
28. See Note, supra note 12, at 1360-61. In the instant case there
is no evidence in the record, nor are there any allegations in the Briefs,
that the districts represent distinct tribes or ethnic groups. However,
the Tribal Constitution, in referring to the "local Council" of each dis-
trict, provides a preliminary indication that the enumerated districts
function as separate communities within the tribe. Also, if distinctive
differences can be shown among the districts, the tribe's argument for
retention of the status quo would be strengthened considerably. See
STAMING RocK Sioux TRIBE CONST. art. V., § 5.
29. Whether the appellees ever sought a remedy from the tribal
government is not clear. While appellees alleged that they had made
repeated efforts to obtain a revision of the voting districts and that
both the Tribal Council and the Tribal Court had refused to consider
their requests, appellants contended that one-man, one-vote was never
raised as an issue before the tribal government until they were served
with a restraining order the day before the general election was to be
held. Answering Brief for Appellees at 4, 5; Reply Brief for Appellants
at 15.
30. O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1148 (8th
Cir. 1973). The Court in O'Neal stated that "the adoption of the Indian
19741
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tial review by the tribal government might have provided the
additional evidence necessary to determine whether the tribe's
election structure was intended to incorporate equal popula-
tion districts or whether tribal culture dictated districts based
on other factors.
The reasoning in White Eagle raises several additional
problems for the future. Tribal councils on some reservations
are appointed, not elected. Certain tribes presently deny women
the right to vote, and others exclude some adult males from par-
ticipating in the election of tribal leaders.3 1 Application of equal
protection standards developed for Anglo-American communities
to these situations would result in considerable modification of
existing tribal culture.
In examining the development of the Indian Civil Rights
Act, it becomes clear that a limited construction of the statu-
tory provisions is required.3 2  The Act does not authorize
Bill of Rights was not meant to detract from the generally recognized
policy, stated in the Williams case, of preserving the 'authority of the
tribal courts . . . .'" Id. at 1146. See also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 223 (1959). However, exhaustion is not an inflexible requirement;
exceptions to the rule have been allowed. McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F.
Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D.
Ariz. 1968). In O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, supra at 1146,
the court found that a "balancing process" was needed under which
"the need to preserve the cultural identity of the tribe by strengthening
the authority of the tribal courts, [must be weighed] against the need
to immediately adjudicate alleged deprivations of individual rights."
31. Reiblich, supra note 26, at 632.
32. In matters involving tribal governments, courts must make a
threshold inquiry into the impact legislation might have on the Indian
culture-how it will affect their cultural autonomy, their desire for tri-
bal harmony, and their status as a self-governing community. Where
it appears that an interpretation will interfere with a strong preexisting
legislative policy, e.g., preserving Indian cultural autonomy, courts
should examine the legislative record to determine whether the legisla-
ture intended the result. Thus courts should realize that reading some
of the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act to mean that the same
standards apply to Indian tribes as apply to state and federal govern-
ments would seriously undermine the tribes' capacity for survival. For
example, the prohibition against racial discrimination as applied to In-
dian tribes might require equal access to reservation resources for cul-
tural foreigners, thereby substantially undercutting the tribe as an eth-
nic unit. See H.M. HART & A. SACIcS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROB-
LEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1144-1417 (tent. ed.
1958), as discussed in Note, supra note 12, at 1354.
For instances in which federal courts have intervened in tribal elec-
tions see Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971); McCurdy
v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973). See also Luxon v. Rosebud
Sioux Tribe of S.D., 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972) (the court held that
the district court had jurisdiction of an action by an enrolled member
of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe for a declaration that a provision of the
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courts to apply broadly such elusive and expanding standards
as equal protection and due process without a sensitive regard
for their impact upon tribal structures and values. 33 Since
plenary power over Indian affairs rests with Congress, federal
judges should refrain from exercising broad powers to estab-
lish policy.3 4
The task for the courts, therefore, is not one of weighing
common law standards against Indian standards or of synthe-
sizing Indian law and common law. In a non-Indian tribunal
it is unlikely that a proper balance will be struck. Instead,
where internal tribal affairs are concerned, the courts should
treat tribal law and tribal decisions with special deference. To
do otherwise is to jeopardize the continued effectiveness of tri-
bal governments as institutions designed to effectuate distinctly
Indian cultural values.3 5 Furthermore, courts should be care-
ful not to apply White Eagle to situations in which neither
Congress nor the court in White Eagle meant it to apply.36
Proper regard for the legislative history of the Indian Civil
Rights Act and for judicial decisions calling for an examina-
tion of the particular culture of the subject tribe, as well as for
tribe's constitution which disqualified an employee of the Public Health
Service from seeking and holding membership on the Tribal Council was
unconstitutional); Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1971)
(Members of the Indian tribe sued the Tribal Council challenging the
right of the Council to exclude electees from seats on the Council. On
motion for temporary injunction, the district court held that subject
matter jurisdiction existed by virtue of allegations that the Council's
action amounted to denial of due process within the meaning of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and was properly enforceable by a civil
proceeding in federal district court.).
33. The court in Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir.
1971), pointed out that the report of the Senate Subcommittee on the
Judiciary makes it clear that Congress intended that the provisions of
the fifteenth amendment, certain procedural provisions of the fifth, sixth
and seventh amendments, and in some respects the equal protection re-
quirement of the fourteenth amendment should not be embraced in the
Indian Bill of Rights.
34. For an argument that judicial restraint is justified by an his-
torical analysis of the relationships between the Indian and the non-
Indian, see Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 Indian Civil
Rights Act, 9 HAv. J. .anos. 557, 621-22 (1972).
35. Cf. O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1146
(8th Cir. 1973).
36. The court in White Eagle pointed out:
We need not explore upon this record the degree to which
federal courts may assert jurisdiction over tribal elections in
all circumstances. Our problem has no such complexities as
tribal membership or blood lines.
478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973).
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the requirement that tribal remedies be explored first, should
limit White Eagle to situations where the tribe itself purports
to have a council elected by the people from equal population
districts. To the extent that federal courts do not require
concrete evidence as to Indian culture before expanding the
scope of the guarantees of the Indian Civil Rights Act, non-In-
dians will again be in the position of imposing external values
upon Indian tribes in contravention of the express congres-
sional policy of recognizing Indian tribes as internally sover-
eign.37
37. See Fretz, The Bill of Rights and American Indian Tribal Gov-
ernments, 6 NAT. RIs. J. 581, 616 (1966).
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Insurance: "Other Insurance" Clauses Purporting to Limit
Recovery Under Uninsured-Motorist Coverage
Void as Repugnant to Statute
Plaintiffs owned four motor vehicles, each of which was cov-
ered by a separate insurance policy issued by defendant. Each
policy provided uninsured-motorist protection with a limit of
$10,000 per person as required by Minnesota statute.' Each
policy further provided that if more than one insurance policy
was applicable to an accident, the total damages recoverable by
the insured would not exceed the amount which would have
been recoverable under the single policy with the highest limits
-in this case $10,000. Plaintiff's injuries resulted from an
accident while riding as a passenger with an uninsured motorist
and were determined by an arbitrator to be $33,000.2 Defend-
ant attempted to limit the recovery to $10,000 in accordance with
the restrictive "other insurance" clauses of the policies. Plain-
tiffs sought and obtained a declaratory judgment that the
"other insurance" provisions were void, and the trial court or-
dered judgment in the amount of $33,000. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding that such provisions were void
as repugnant to the statute. Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Insur-
ance Co., - Minn. - , 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973).3
Van Tassel was the first Minnesota case to raise the issue of
whether a statute requiring uninsured-motorist coverage in spec-
ified minimum limits in every policy denies an insurer the
right to restrict recovery to the limits of a single policy when
more than one policy applies to an accident. However, the
Minnesota statute4 and the "other insurance" clauses of the in-
1. M_.NN. STAT. § 65B.22 (3) (1971).
2. Plaintiff Theodore Van Tassel was personally involved in the
accident and was awarded $21,000. His father, plaintiff Beltram Van
Tassel, was awarded $12,000 with respect to his derivative claim.
3. Clauses purporting to reduce recovery by the amount previ-
ously paid for medical expenses pursuant to separate provisions of two
of the policies were also held to be repugnant to the statute and void.
In a companion case, Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., - Minn. -, 207
N.W.2d 535 (1973), the Van Tassel rule was applied to a somewhat
different factual situation, discussed in note 5 infra. Subsequently, in
Brunmeier v. Farmers Ins. Exch., - Minn. -, 208 N.W.2d 860 (1973),
the court invalidated a provision purporting to reduce recovery under
uninsured-motorist coverage by the amount paid under workmen's com-
pensation.
4. No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of
insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed
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surance contracts 5 in the instant case are typical of those which
have been the subject of litigation in other jurisdictions. These
restrictive clauses survived the earliest challenges,0 but begin-
ning with Virginia in 1965, some 25 state courts have invalidated
such clauses on statutory grounds, 7 and presently only a few
by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person aris-
ing out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with re-
spect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in
this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto, under provisions approved by the commissioner of in-
surance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or opera-
tors of uninsured motor vehicles, including colliding motor ve-
hicles whose operators or owners are unknown or are unidenti-
fiable at the time of the accident, and whose identity does not
become known thereafter, because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom .... The policy
limits of the coverage required to be offered by this section
shall be as set forth in (the Safety Responsibility Act, luImx.
STAT. § 170.25(3) (1971), which specifies limits of $10,000 "for
one person" and $20,000 "in any one accident"].
MINqN. STAT. § 72A.149(l) (1967), as amended, MN. STAT, § 65B.22(3)
(1971). The amendments are discussed in the text accompanying notes
43-46 infra.
5. The contract provided in pertinent part as follows:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying
an automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance
under Part IV [relating to uninsured-motorist coverage] shall
apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance
available to such insured and applicable to such automobile as
primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in
the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage
exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
("Excess-escape" clause]
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the in-
sured has other similar insurance available to him and appli-
cable to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to ex-
ceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this in-
surance and such other insurance, and the company shall not
be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this cov-
erage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the
sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and
such other insurance. ["Prorata" clause]
Minn. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 349-50. Identical clauses are used
throughout the insurance industry. See Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, 36 INs. COUNSEL J. 397, 423-24 (1969). The "prorata" provi-
sion was involved in Van Tassel, while the "excess-escape" provision
was the subject of the companion case, Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
- Minn. -, 207 N.W.2d 535 (1973). The court reached the same result
in both cases, observing that "for all practical purposes the legal issues
are the same." Id. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 537. This observation is evi-
dently shared by courts in other jurisdictions since the two situations
have never been distinguished for purposes of analysis.
6. Chandler v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 420 (5th
Cir. 1965) (applying Florida law); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316
F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963) (applying Virginia law).
7. E.g., Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 S.2d
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states enforce clauses denying multiple recovery.8 Thus, Min-
nesota has adopted what has become the majority view.
Specifically relying on recent decisions in Michigan o and
Nebraska, 10 the court in Van Tassel employed both of the argu-
ments which have prevailed in the majority jurisdictions. First,
since the insured has paid four premiums for four policies, the
insurer should not deny him the benefit of "what he paid for
on each policy." Second, by making minimum uninsured-motor-
ist protection mandatory in every policy, the statute forbids at-
tempts to limit that protection by means of "other insurance"
clauses." Because of this dual rationale, it is possible to ana-
689 (Fla. 1966) (disapproving Chandler); Bryant v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965) (expressly disapprov-
ing Wells); see Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
8. See, e.g., Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemn. Co., 25 Utah
2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971); Morelock v. Millers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 49
Ill. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1 (1971); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H.
422, 213 A.2d 420 (1965). The view generally taken in these jurisdic-
tions is that it is anomalous to permit the victim of a negligent unin-
sured motorist to recover more than he would have been entitled to
if the tortfeasor had been insured for the statutory minimum amounts:
The design and purpose of the uninsured motorist statute
was to provide protection only up to the minimum statutory
limits for bodily injury caused by financially irresponsible mo-
torists. The statute was not designed to provide the insured
with greater insurance protection than would have been avail-
able had the insured been injured by an operator with a policy
containing minimum statutory limits.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. at 424, 213 A.2d at 422. For a
further discussion of difficulties with the majority view, see notes 47
and 48 infra.
9. Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 32 Mich. App. 115,
188 N.W.2d 216 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 464, 201 N.W.2d 786 (1972); Col-
lins v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 36 Mich. App. 424, 194 N.W.2d 148 (1971);
cited in - Minn. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 351.
10. Bose v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 209, 181 N.W.
2d 839 (1970); Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 181
N.W.2d 835 (1970); Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156
N.W.2d 133 (1968); cited in - Minn. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 351.
11. The court stated:
It seems to us that, in spite of the attempt by the insurer
to limit its liability to one policy or to the amount recoverable
under one policy, the fact that the legislature required an un-
insured-motorist provision in all policies, added to the fact that
a premium has been collected on each of the policies involved,
should result in the policyholder's receiving what he paid for
on each policy, up to the full amount of his damages. It is
true that such holding results in permissible recovery exceeding
what he would have received if the uninsured motorist had
been insured for the minimum amount required under our
Safety Responsibility Act. But if the question must be resolved
on the basis of who gets a windfall, it seems more just that
the insured who has paid a premium should get all he paid
for rather than that the insurer should escape liability for that
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lyze the Van Tassel holding from two perspectives-interpreta-
tion of the contract or interpretation of the statute.
Interpretation of the contract becomes important because
of the emphasis in recent cases, as summarized by the Van Tas-
sel court, on "the policyholder's receiving what he paid for on
each policy. ' 12 In determining what the insured has "paid
for," however, it is necessary to look beyond a formalistic pro-
portion between premiums and recovery in a specific accident to
the entire range of hazards against which the premiums are in-
tended to purchase protection. In Van Tassel, a semiannual pre-
mium of two dollars was paid for uninsured-motorist protection
under each of plaintiffs' four policies.' " Thus, plaintiffs were
paying eight dollars every six months for $10,000 of coverage on
each of four vehicles. In contrast to this, it was developed by
plaintiffs' counsel at trial that $50,000 of coverage on one auto-
mobile was available from defendant for a semiannual pre-
mium of $5.50.14 It is at precisely this point that the superficial
use of arithmetic confuses the issue. Since four times $10,000 is
$40,000, it might appear that plaintiffs were buying $40,000 of
protection for $8.00 while they could have had $50,000 of protec-
tion for only $5.50. Indeed, plaintiffs' counsel employed these
very figures, summarizing the evidence as an illustration that
"the single policy of uninsured-motorist coverage with limits of
$50,000-$100,000 would provide $10,000 more coverage to persons
in plaintiffs' situation at a cheaper price than that paid by plain-
tiffs."'15 This implies that the insurance company is getting a
windfall even if its liability is limited to $40,000 under the four
policies, and that a fortiori it is unjust to limit liability to a
mere $10,000. However, such reasoning is specious: quadruple
depth of coverage ($40,000 on one vehicle) is not as costly to the
insurer as quadruple breadth of coverage ($10,000 on four vehi-
cles). The reason lies in the relative infrequency of large
claims. 16 It is no more costly for an insurer to pay a small claim
for which it collected a premium.
- Minn. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 351-52.
12. Id. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 352. Indeed, an examination of the
recent decisions purporting to reach a result compelled by the statute
discloses that they are actually based to a large extent on the rather
obvious common law principle that a person ought to receive what he
has "paid for." This dual rationale produces the awkward result dis-
cussed in note 48 infra.
13. See Findings of Fact II, Brief for Appellant at A-17.
14. Transcript of Proceedings at 12-13.
15. Brief for Appellee at 3.
16. At the trial, an insurance analyst from the state insurance do-
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on a small policy than on a large policy. Thus, increases in pre-
miums are not ordinarily proportional to increases in policy
limits which increase depth of coverage on one item.' 7
On the other hand, it should be expected that premiums
will increase (as in the instant case) in approximate proportion
to the expanded breadth of coverage, measured by increases in
the number of items insured. Since a different motor vehicle
was identified in each policy in Van Tassel,1 8 it is clear that de-
fendant-insurer agreed to be exposed to the risks associated
with the operation of any or all of them. It may reasonably
be expected that four vehicles would receive more use than only
one and that exposure to risk would increase roughly propor-
tionally to that increase in use. This increased exposure is what
defendant undertook in consideration of plaintiffs' payment of
the multiple premiums.
The determination of what the insured has "paid for" need
not produce identical results in every case.10 Regarding any
given level of recovery when all claims are aggregated, it should
partment testified as follows in response to questions from plaintiffs'
counsel:Q. [W]hen you talk about, say a $50,000.00 coverage now, the
same company would charge only $5.50 for $50,000.00 pri-
mary [per person] and $100,000.00 secondary [per accident)
coverage; are you familiar with that information?
A. Yes, I know what you're talking about. The $2.00 pre-
mium, 10-20 was the basic. When you buy higher limits,
factors that are used on the base rate is [sic] not an
equal times amount or factor.
Q. It goes down?
A. It's a graduated factor.
Q. There is [sic] less big claims?
A. Right.
Transcript of Proceedings at 37.
17. For example, the following basic passenger automobile rates
(before adjustments for age of drivers, distance driven to work, etc.)
are presently used to compute premiums in Minnesota territory 01:
Limits of coverage Basic annual Basic annual
per person/ bodily injury uninsured-motorist
per accident liability premium coverage premium
10,000/$20,000 $49.00 $5.00
25,0001550,000 $60.00 $7.00
150,000/$100,000 $66.00 19.00$100,000/$300,000 $73.00 $11.00
See INsURANcE SERVICES OFICE, PRavATE PASSENGER AuToMogr MAN-
umi, MNwqsoTA 1, E-l, E-3 (1972).
18. Findings of Fact I, Brief for Appellant at A-17.
19. There is no guarantee, for example, that the members of a four-
car family will be on the road exactly four times as much as if they
owned only one vehicle. Similarly, ownership of four vehicles does not
necessarily quadruple one's risk of injury while riding as a passenger
in an uninsured vehicle.
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be sufficient for an insurer to reason as follows: (1) appropri-
ate premium revenue should be proportional to compensation
paid; (2) compensation paid will be proportional to the fre-
quency of claims; (3) the frequency of claims will be propor-
tional to the number of vehicles insured; and therefore, (4) pre-
mium revenue should be made proportional to the number of
vehicles insured. 20 Despite the elusiveness of mathematical pre-
cision in any particular case, there appears to be no impropriety
in such assumptions nor in proration of resultant premium
charges among all vehicles insured by the insurer, especially
when the semiannual premium is only two dollars per vehicle
under such proration. Thus, a court should not necessarily con-
clude that an insured has not received what he has "paid for"
even though recovery limits are not proportional to the pre-
miums paid. The critical proportion is the ratio of premiums to
the insurer's overall exposure to risk. In these terms, the ef-
fect of Van Tassel is to grant the insured much more than he
has "paid for,"'2 1 and its soundness is questionable.
A better approach would have been to observe the simi-
larity between the uninsured-motorist provisions and the gen-
eral liability policies which they supplement. Recovery under
liability provisions is often prorated pursuant to "other insur-
ance" clauses similar to those involved in the instant case,22 and
such proration is expressly authorized by statute.23  The courts
20. This is a simplified "pure premium" approach which disregards
such factors as risk classifications, geographic territories and variations
among the sizes of claims. These factors are discussed in Morris, Enter-
prise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Fore-
sight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 567-69 (1961). See also J. ATHEAnN, RISK AND
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1969); S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK JR. & R. CLINE, PROP-
ERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE (1968).
21. I.e., quadruple coverage on four vehicles. Accepting the court's
premise that depth and breadth of coverage are to be measured by the
same standard, Minnesota law now apparently requires uninsured-mo-
torist coverage to be proportional to the square of the premiums in
such cases. Such a result has staggering implications for the owner
of a fleet of vehicles.
22. See, e.g., Miller v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas.
Co., 470 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1972); Sathre v. Brewer, 289 Minn. 424, 184
N.W.2d 668 (1971); Dukeman v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 286 Minn. 118,
174 N.W.2d 237 (1970); Federal Ins. Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218,
153 N.W.2d 429 (1967); Olson v. Hertz Corp., 270 Minn. 223, 133 N.W.2d
519 (1965); Eicher v. Universal Underwriters, 250 Minn. 7, 83 N.W.2d
895 (1957).
23. "Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide for the prorat-
ing of the insurance thereunder with other valid and collectible insur-
ance." MINN. STAT. § 170.40(9) (1971). Although this provision when
enacted applied only to liability policies, the language is arguably broad
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have chafed under the burden of litigation generated by these
"other insurance" clauses, and at least one court concerned
with Minnesota law has suggested the need for legislative inter-
vention.24 Even in that case, however, the suggestion was not
that "other insurance" clauses be invalidated but only that the
concepts of "primary" and "secondary" liability which they in-
troduce be legislatively defined.25 No matter what definition of
"primary" and "secondary" liability is adopted, the result inevi-
tably denies or limits recovery under one or more policies for
which the insured has paid a premium. Similarly, the Van Tas-
sel court could have properly denied multiple recovery on the
grounds that what the insured "paid for" was in fact four con-
tracts limiting the insurer's liability in accordance with the
"other insurance" clauses in question.20  In this respect, the ef-
fect of the "other insurance" clauses would not differ from the
effect upheld in the liability precedents.
The justification for creating a different rule that refuses to
apply the statutory approval of proration to uninsured-motorist
coverage must be found, if at all, from the perspective of statu-
tory interpretation. The Minnesota statute provides, in perti-
nent part:
enough to have been applied to uninsured-motorist protection provided
'thereunder" pursuant to subsequent legislation if the Van Tassel court
had chosen to do so.
24. Circuit Judge Lay, writing for the court in Miller v. National
Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 470 F.2d 700, 701 (8th Cir. 1972),
stated:
In an action for a declaratory judgment the district court
was faced, as we are on appeal, with the repetitive task of un-
tangling another web of confusion created by the inarticulate
language of two automobile policies.
In a footnote he elaborated on the problem:
It would make interesting statistics to see how many in-
surance companies require litigation to settle controversies aris-
ing from the conflicting and ambiguous escape clauses in their
respective policies. No one case ever seems to conclusively de-
fine the respective obligations. Each company, undaunted by
prior decisions, continues in unremitting litigation with the only
significant result being infinite expense and court congestion.
... Hopefully, state legislatures or the companies themselves
will someday declare a simple rule governing the relationship
of primary and secondary carriers where overlapping coverage
occurs.
Id. at 701 n.1.
25. Id.
26. This view has apparently been articulated only by Justice
Newton of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, dissenting in Protective Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 218, 181 N.W.2d 835, 838 (1970), al-




No ... policy ... shall be delivered ... unless coverage
is provided ... for the protection of persons insured there-
under who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles . . . [in specified
minimum limits]. 27
Interpreted in its context, it is questionable whether this lan-
guage supports the conclusion reached by the court. It was
added in 196728 to the statutory design inaugurated by the
Safety Responsibility Act of 1933.29 The original act was typical
of legislation then becoming prevalent throughout the coun-
try. 0 It required a financially irresponsible 3' motorist involved
in an accident to offer proof of financial responsibility as a con-
dition of retaining his driver's license.32 Except for owners of
fleets of vehicles, who may qualify as self-insurers, 33 financial
responsibility has been delineated by the act in terms of mini-
mum limits of liability insurance. At present, these limits in
Minnesota are $10,000 "for one person" and $20,000 "in any one
accident" for personal injury or death and $5,000 "in any one ac-
cident" for property damage. 34
While such legislation may encourage financial responsi-
bility, it cannot guarantee compensation to the injured person
when the tortfeasor happens notwithstanding to be irresponsi-
ble or is unidentified. This deficiency was addressed by the in-
27. MINN. STAT. § 65B.22(3) (1971), quoted in note 4 supra.
28. Minn. Laws 1967, ch. 837.
29. Minn. Laws 1933, ch. 351, as amended, MINN. STAT. §§ 170.21-
.58 (1971).
30. See Donaldson, supra note 5, at 397-98.
31. The original criterion for financial irresponsibility necessary to
bring the statute into operation was the failure to satisfy a final judg-
ment of liability for personal injury or property damage in excess of
$100 resulting from the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle. In
1945, the act was rewritten and its application was extended to the
owner or operator of any motor vehicle involved in a reported accident.
Minn. Laws 1945, ch. 285; MiNN. STAT. §§ 170.21-.58 (1971). The provi-
sions of the act do not apply to the owner or driver of a vehicle in-
volved in an accident causing no injury or damage to anyone other
than such owner or driver, to the owner or driver of a vehicle legally
stopped, standing or parked at the time of the accident, to the owner
of a motor vehicle being used without his permission at the time of
the accident, or to a person who appears not liable for any damages,
who is released from liability or who executes a satisfactory confession
of judgment or agreement to pay. MINN. STAT. § 170.26 (1971).
32. The license of a Minnesota resident is suspended. A non-resi-
dent is denied the privilege of operating a motor vehicle within the
state. MrNN. STAT. § 170.25(1) (1971).
33. MmN. STAT. § 170.52 (1971).




surance companies in the mid-1950's, when they began writing
"uninsured-motorist" protection.3 5 In 1957, New Hampshire be-
came the first state to require that such protection be offered
with every automobile liability policy in limits at least equal
to the statutory requirement for financial responsibility."0 Sim-
ilar legislation,37 including the 1967 Minnesota statute, has now
been enacted in every jurisdiction except Maryland 38 and the
District of Columbia.
The fact that the legislature has defined "financial responsi-
bility" in terms of liability insurance in certain minimum lim-
its "for one person" and "in any one accident" raises a strong
inference that these limits express a legislative determination of
the minimum protection an injured person should find avail-
able. This minimum protection is required "for one person"
and "in any one accident" but not necessarily "per policy."
There is no reason to impute a different intent to the 1967 unin-
sured-motorist act which filled a gap left by the 1933 financial
responsibility requirement and which explicitly adopted the fi-
nancial responsibility criteria.39  The statute requires that
such protection be offered with all policies in limits of at least
$10,000 "for one person." Van Tassel's four policies would all
have provided such "protection" even if the restrictive "other
insurance" clauses had been enforced since by the very terms of
those clauses, each policy would have been operable to the full
$10,000 limit in the absence of other coverage. In other words,
each policy protected the insured from the possibility of
being without the minimum amount of available insurance pre-
scribed by the statute.40  The Van Tassel holding in effect in-
35. Donaldson, supra note 5, at 399; Widiss, Perspectives on Unin-
sured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 497, 499 (1967).
36. NIL Laws 1957, 305:8; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 268:15 (1966).
37. At present, uninsured-motorist coverage may be rejected by the
insured in writing in about 30 states but may not be rejected for passen-
ger automobiles in the remaining states, including Minnesota.
38. Maryland maintains a State Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment
Fund for compensation of persons injured by uninsured motorists. Me.
A- N. CODE art. 66%, § 7-603 (1970).
39. See note 4 supra.
40. Virginia's statute, which was the first to be construed so as to
invalidate an "other insurance" clause in Bryant v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965), may require more
than the Minnesota statute. It provides:
Nor shall any such [bodily injury liability] policy or con-
tract relating to ownership, maintenance or use of a motor ve-
hicle be so issued or delivered unless it contains an endorsement
or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums which
he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits
1974]
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terprets the legislative intent to be that the minimum protec-
tion available to a passenger in an uninsured motor vehicle
shall be proportional to the number of insured vehicles his family
happens to own. No reason is suggested for such legislative
discrimination in favor of passengers from multiple-car families.
The Van Tassel decision reflects a consumer protective com-
mitment in insurance matters and confirms the court's previ-
ously expressed preference for the insured over the insurer and
for full compensation over partial compensation. 41 On this ba-
sis, similar decisions in other jurisdictions have been favorably
received in academic literature.42 However, such a rule is inap-
propriate against the unique statutory backdrop now present in
Minnesota, which has been developed since the date of the acci-
dent that precipitated the Van Tassel litigation and thus was not
strictly controlling in the case. Recent changes in the statute
suggest that the legislature, not the court, has taken the better
approach to the problem of the undercompensated victim of a
financially irresponsible motorist.
Effective January 1, 1971, the legislature withdrew from the
insured his right to reject uninsured-motorist coverage. 48 On
the same date, insurers became obligated to offer such coverage
in the same limits as carried by the insured in liability cover-
age. 44 Moreover, a 1971 amendment, effective January 1, 1972,
which shall be no less than the requirements of . . . the Code
herein ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(b) (1970). Arguably, "undertaking to pay
. . . all sums" is a stronger term than the "coverage ... for the protec-
tion" required in Minnesota.
41. See, e.g., Orren v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 288 Minn. 225, 179 N.W.2d
166 (1970); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nyquist, 286 Minn. 157,
175 N.W.2d 494 (1970); Quaderer v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 263 Minn.
383, 116 N.W.2d 605 (1962).
42. See, e.g., Note, Invalidity of "Other Insurance" Clauses in a
Double Coverage Situation, 4 SErON HALL L. REv. 697, 711-12 (1973);
Comment, The Invalidity of the "Other Insurance" Provision: A New
Majority, 17 S.D.L. REv. 152, 155, 164 (1972). But see Comment, Lim-
itations of Liability Within Uninsured Motorist Insurance Policies and
their Validity Under Mandatory Statutes, 52 NEm. L. REv. 158, 171-76
(1972).
43. Minn. Laws 1969, ch. 630; MINN. STAT. § 65B.22(3) (1971).
44. Minn. Laws 1967, ch. 837; MINN. STAT. § 65B.22(3) (1971). One
result of this change was to create by statute the anomalous result
reached by many courts and discussed in note 8 supra: the injured
victim of an uninsured motorist will be better off than he would have
been if the motorist had been insured in the minimum limits prescribed
by the Safety Responsibility Act. Significantly, this inconsistency ex-
isted for only a year before it was corrected by the 1971 amendment.
See note 45 infra.
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required insurers to offer "underinsured-motorist" coverage
with every policy.45 In other words, while from 1967 through
1970 an insured was protected by the statute only to the $10,000
minimum, the legislature provided that as of January 1, 1971,
he would be entitled to the same protection against an unin-
sured motorist as he provided for others to have against him-
self. One year later, he became entitled to protect himself
against all motorists, insured or uninsured, to the same extent
he protects others against himself. If he carries liability insur-
ance in greater than the required limits, he may arrange for
lower underinsured-motorist limits but in no case less than the
persistent $10,000 minimum.4 6
The legislature has guaranteed the insured considerable
freedom to contract for uninsured/underinsured-motorist pro-
tection within the limits of his liability coverage as a maximum
and the statutory $10,000 limit as a minimum. Under the Van
Tassel rule, the freedom of a multiple-car owner is impaired
since he cannot contract for only the minimum coverage. At
the other end of the statutory range, the freedom of the single-
car owner is also impaired since he enjoys no opportunity to
inflate his uninsured-motorist protection by means of cumula-
tive policies. Thus, when evaluated by standards established
by recent legislative changes, the Van Tassel result is not as
consumer-protective as it may have appeared. It has created an
awkward wrinkle in the otherwise consistent fabric of a statute
which does not distinguish between liability and uninsured-mo-
torist protection 47 nor between owners of one vehicle and own-
45. [S]upplemental insurance coverages shall as a minimum
include:
(d) Beginning January 1, 1972, underinsured motorist cov-
erage, whereby subject to the terms and conditions of such cov-
erage the insurance company agrees to pay its own insured for
such uncompensated damages as he may recover on account
of an automobile accident because the judgment recovered
against the owner of the other vehicle exceeds the policy limits
thereon, to the extent of the policy limits on the vehicle of
the party recovering or such smaller limits as he may select
less the amount paid by the liability insurer of the party re-
covered against.
Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 581; Mhw. STAT. § 65B.26 (1971). Minnesota is a
pioneer in this field.
46. Id.
47. If the situation in Van Tassel were reversed and the uninsured
motorist were a passenger in one of the insured's vehicles and injured
as a result of the insured's negligence, the Van Tassel rationale would
suggest that the insured could look to the insurer to assume his liability
to the combined limits of all four policies since the legislature has re-
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ers of several.48 Thus, it would be undesirable to apply the Van
Tassel rule to insurance contracts drawn since January 1, 1972.
quired minimum liability coverage in all policies and a premium has
been collected on each of the policies involved. Cf. the court's argument
in - Minn. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 352, quoted in note 11 supra. However,
such a result may be avoided by appropriate language in the policy.
See note 23 supra.
48. For example, if plaintiff owned four vehicles, each insured by
defendant with uninsured-motorist coverage in limits of $50,000 per per-
son rather than the minimum $10,000, the Van Tassel rule would seem-
ingly allow recovery up to $200,000 since "a premium has been collected
on each of the policies involved." - Minn. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 352.
No illustration better reveals the weakness of the court's dual "paid
for"/statutory approach. In such a case, the court would be compelled
to hold that an "other insurance" clause purporting to limit recovery
to $50,000 is repugnant to the statute which sets forth a minimum of
only $10,000. See note 12 supra.
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Securities Regulation: Exchange of Stock Pursuant to
Merger is not a "Sale" by an Insider Under Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
On May 8, 1967, after unsuccessfully seeking to merge with
petitioner's predecessor (Old Kern), respondent Occidental' an-
nounced an offer to purchase the outstanding shares of stock of
Old Kern.2 During the tender offer campaign, which expired
on June 8, 1967, respondent purchased more than 10 percent
of the outstanding stock of Old Kern. Respondent was blocked
in its takeover bid by a defensive merger3 between Old Kern
and Tenneco4 in which Old Kern stockholders were to receive
new Tenneco stock on a share-for-share basis.
On June 2, 1967, respondent executed a binding option to
sell to Tenneco at a date over six months after the tender offer
expired all the new Tenneco stock to, which respondent would
be entitled when the merger took place. The merger transac-
tion was closed on August 30, 1967, and respondent thereupon
became irrevocably entitled to receive Tenneco stock in ex-
change for its Old Kern stock. Thus, both the execution of the
option and the exchange of shares took place within six
months of the date on which respondent became the owner of
of more than 10 percent of the stock of Old Kern. The option
1. Respondent, Occidental Petroleum Corp., is a California corpo-
ration with its principal place of business in California. Occidental is
engaged in the production and sale of oil, gas, coal, sulphur and fer-
tilizers.
2. Old Kern was a California corporation having substantial real
estate holdings for oil production, oil exploration, cattle ranching and
cattle feeding and interests in the manufacture of automotive parts, elec-
tronic systems and devices, farm machinery and construction equipment.
3. Technically what occurred was a sale of assets by Old Kern.
This enabled the Kern-Tenneco group to obtain the benefit of CAL.. CORP.
CODE § 3901 (West 1955) which only requires a simple majority of all
voting shares for approval of a sale of assets as opposed to the two-
thirds vote required for approval of a merger by CAL. CORP. CODE §
4107 (West 1955), as amended (West Supp. 1973).
4. Tenneco, a Delaware corporation, is a diversified industrial
company with operations in natural gas transmission, oil and gas, chem-
icals, packaging, manufacturing and shipbuilding. The plan of merger
provided for the transfer of Old Kern's assets to Kern County Land
Co., a newly organized and wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco Corp,
itself a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco. Kern County Land Co.
was organized specifically to receive the assets of Old Kern, and it occu-
pied the third rung in a three-tier holding company series.
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was exercised on December 11, 1967, and the sale to Tenneco
yielded respondent a profit of approximately $19 million.5
Petitioner sought to recover this profit in a suit under
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.0 The
district court held that both the execution of the option on
June 2, 1967, and the exchange of Old Kern shares for shares
of Tenneco on August 30, 1967, were "sales" under section
16(b) .7 The court accordingly ordered respondent to disgorge
the profit realized from the sale. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed and ordered summary judgment en-
tered dismissing petitioner's complaint.8 The court held that
neither the option nor the exchange constituted a "sale" within
the purview of section 16(b). The United States Supreme
Court affirmed. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows
5. The total profit on the sale of the stock to Tenneco was
$17,712,980. This included the $8,886,230 premium paid in June. In ad-
dition, Occidental received dividends totaling $1,793,439.22. Thus, Occi-
dental's total profit was $19,506,419.22 on the shares obtained through
its tender offer.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). The statute provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of informa-
tion which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer,
any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period of less than six
months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in con-
nection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and
be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on
the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer
or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and
in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be
brought more than two years after the date such profit was
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at
the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase,
of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions
which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt
as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
See also note 11 infra.
7. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).




the issuer of securities registered under section 12 of the Act,9
or a stockholder suing on its behalf, to recover any "profit
realized 10 by insiders on "short swing" securities transac-
tions. The section covers the purchase and sale (or sale and
purchase) of any equity security within a six month period
by those persons defined as insiders."' There are only two
prerequisites to the application of section 16(b): it must be
shown (1) that the defendant was an insider at the time of the
purchase and sale, and (2) that the purchase and sale were
made within a six month period. Although the stated purpose
of the statute is to prevent the unfair use of inside informa-
tion,12 the courts have never required proof of actual use of
such information as a prerequisite to its application. Once the
statutory conditions have been fulfilled, it is irrelevant that
the insider either did not make unfair use of inside informa-
tion or did not intend at the time he purchased the security to
sell it within six months; section 16(b) applies irrespective of
the good faith or intent of the insider.1"
Liability under section 16(b) often turns upon a determi-
nation of whether a "purchase" or a "sale" of securities has
occurred.14 The problem of determining whether a pur-
9. Section 12(g) requires the registration by an issuer having total
assets exceeding $1,000,000 of each class of equity security held of record
by 500 or more persons if such issuer is engaged in interstate commerce
or in a business affecting such commerce or if its securities are traded
by use of the mails or interstate commerce. In addition, any issuer
having a class of equity securities registered on a national securities
exchange must register the securities under section 12. 15 U.S.C. § 781
(a), (g) (1) (1970).
10. Profits recoverable under section 16 (b) are computed by appli-
cation of the lowest-in-highest-out theory of liability. This formula,
which arbitrarily matches purchases with sales in order to maximize the
determination of profits, may result in a large recovery when the se-
quence of transactions actually produced an overall loss. See, e.g., Gratz
v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 50-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920
(1951).
11. An insider for the purposes of section 16 (b) is a "person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum
of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or who is a
director or an officer of the issuer of such security .... " 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a) (1970).
12. See note 6 supra.
13. See 2 L. Loss, SEcuRTs REGuLATIoN 1041 (2d ed. 1961); W.
PAnTR, FDE=AL REGuLATION Op INsmEa TAnING 25 (1968). The origi-
nal drafts of the bill would have barred only the improper disclosure
of inside information. The difficulty of proving such a disclosure, how-
ever, prompted the change to the current form. See S. 2693, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934); H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
14. Section 3 (a) (13) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines
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chase and a sale have occurred within a period of six months
presents little difficulty when the transactions consist of an ex-
change of cash for stock or stock for cash." The problem be-
comes more difficult, however, when the transactions have at
one or both ends exchanges of stock that are not clearly either
purchases or sales. These "unorthodox"' 0 transactions have
been responsible for most of the litigation under section 16(b).
The courts have developed two different approaches in at-
tempting to apply the terms "purchase" and "sale" to some of
the unorthodox exchanges of securities. Variously described as
the "objective" or "per se" and the "subjective" or "prag-
matic" tests, 17 they represent conflicting views as to how the
the purposes of the section should be realized. The objective
test is geared toward the broadest possible construction of
"purchase" and "sale" and results in an all-inclusive prohibi-
tion under section 16(b).18 The test entails little or no inquiry
"purchase" to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise ac-
quire," and section 3 (a) (14) defines "sale" to include "any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13),(14) (1970). As
is readily apparent, these statutory definitions do not furnish explicit
direction with respect to the treatment under section 16 (b) of insiders'
securities transactions in corporate reorganizations, mergers and other
complex business dealings. This lack of direction is probably responsible
for the different approaches which have been developed by the courts
to resolve the legal issues arising out of such transactions.
15. The courts have followed the traditional mechanical approach
set out in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (plaintiff need not show intention of the in-
sider to deal in the security within six months, nor must he prove ac-
tual unfair use of inside information).
16. The term is from 2 L. Loss, SEcuianIS REGULATION 1069 (2d
ed. 1961). It includes such transactions as mergers, conversions, options
and reclassifications.
17. Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider
Trading, 54 CoasFiLu L. Rav. 45, 45-46 (1968); Note, Short-Swing "Pur-
chase and Sales" Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Nw. U.L. Rv.
448, 455 (1966).
18. Even so, the statute is really only a halfway measure or, as
the chief spokesman for the draftsmen and proponents of the Act termed
it, a "crude rule of thumb." Statement of Thomas B. Corcoran, Hear-
ings on S. 84, S. 56 and S. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934). It is likely that a con-
siderable volume of trading by insiders is continuing under circum-
stances which amount to what is in effect an exemption from liability
due to the six month restriction in section 16(b). An insider possessed
of inside information is free to purchase equity securities of his company,
wait for their value to rise and then dispose of them after the six month
period has elapsed. Similarly, if possessed of information which signi-
fies an imminent fall in price, the insider may sell, wait for the six
month period to expire and then repurchase.
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into either the manner in which a transaction was accomplished
or the reasons behind it.19 While its clarity might have
value, the objective test can lead to "manifestly absurd and
unfair"20  results which involve "purposeless harshness.121
On the other hand, the subjective test focuses on whether a
transaction is of the type the statute was designed to pre-
vent.22  Thus, it limits the applicability of the "purchase"
and "sale" provision of section 16(b) to those transactions in
which a possibility of speculative abuse exists. This determi-
nation is made on the basis of an examination of the facts of
each case. The requirement of an initial finding that inside
information could at least potentially have been misused for
personal profit means that the harshness of the section is
brought to bear only where the deterrent effect is necessary.2 3
Recent decisions dealing with such unorthodox transactions as
conversions, mergers and options have used the latter ap-
proach.2 4
19. Although the objective test was the original one used, it has
been applied in full force in only a few cases. See Heli-Coil Corp.
v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte,
160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Hodg-
kinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). In Park & Tiford defendant
insiders converted their preferred stock pursuant to a call for redemp-
tion by the company. The issue in the case was whether the conversion
was a "purchase" of common stock. The court, in a manner character-
istic of the objective test, answered affirmatively, stating: '"Defendants
did not own the common stock in question before they exercised their
option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the
stock, within the meaning of the Act." Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte,
supra, at 987.
20. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 535 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
21. Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
22. Section 16 (b) was enacted to take the profit out of short-swing
speculative trading in the equity securities of publicly held corporations
by insiders whose position gives them both access to information not
available to the investing public and possibly the ability to influence
the policies taken by their corporations. See generally S. REP. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934); S. Rzp. No. 792, 73d Cong, 2d Sess.
7-9 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934); Hear-
ings on S. 84, S. 56 and S. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., and 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 6463-
81 (1934); Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1934).
23. See Lowenfels, supra note 17, at 57-60.
24. The subjective test was first applied to a section 16 (b) convert-
ible security case in Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959), where the court set forth the test as the
standard for decision: "Every transaction which can reasonably be de-
fined as a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind
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Although conversions of one equity security into another
have now been exempted from the operation of section 16(b), 2 1
courts have continued to apply the subjective test developed in
conversion cases to those involving other unorthodox transac-
tions. For example, in Newmark v. RKO General, Inc.2 0 the
subjective test was used to determine that an exchange of stock
pursuant to a merger was a "sale" within the meaning of sec-
tion 16 (b). The decision in Kern is significant because it is
the first time any court has held that an exchange of securities
of one company for those of another under a plan of merger
did not constitute such a "sale." Prior cases involving merg-
ers and other corporate acquisitions had almost uniformly re-
sulted in the imposition of section 16 (b) liability.2 7
Kern also has significance with respect to the problem of
determining what kind of option agreement constitutes a "sale"
which can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by Section
16(b)." Id. at 345. In examining the conversion on its particular
facts, the court concluded that the transaction in Ferraiolo was not a
purchase because the "conversion of . . . preferred to . .. common had
none of the economic indicia of a purchase," and "[the transaction was
not one that could have lent itself to the practices which Section 16(b)
was enacted to prevent." Id. at 346. See Comment, The Scope of "Pur-
chase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 59 YALE L.J.
510, 513 (1950). Two conversion cases which followed Ferraiolo virtual-
ly adopted its approach. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967). See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co.
v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc.,
425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Blau v. Max
Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965);
American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.166-9 (1973).
26. 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970). RKO
General had entered into an agreement to purchase the shares of certain
major shareholders of Central Airlines at a fixed price upon the condi-
tion that Central merge with Frontier Airlines. The court found a possi-
bility of speculative abuse both because RKO had obtained its option
to purchase Central stock before the news of the merger was made
public and because it had control over the terms and date of the merger.
27. See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418
(1972); Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212
F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); American Standard,
Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.DN.Y. 1972); Gold v. Scurlock,
324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151
(S.DN.Y. 1965), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co.
v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd on other grounds,
232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); Fistel v. Christ-
man, 135 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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or "purchase." Traditionally the question as to whether a pur-
chase or sale occurs at the time of the execution or at the time
of the exercise of an option has hinged upon the determina-
tion of when the "insider's rights and obligations became
fixed."28 The courts have also used the subjective test to de-
termine whether an option agreement constitutes a purchase or
sale,29 however, and have thus considered the factor of possi-
ble abuse of inside information in situations where the option
could be used as an instrument to manipulate the sale or pur-
chase of the underlying security.30 As discussed below, the
Kern decision contributed some desirable clarification of the
theretofore murky analysis used by the courts when confronted
with option agreements.
Before dealing with the specific issues raised in Kern, the
Court sanctioned the possibility-of-speculative-abuse test as the
correct way to decide whether "borderline transactions are
within the reach of the statute."3' Then, as it was undis-
puted that Occidental's acquisition of more than 10 percent of
the outstanding stock of Old Kern through its tender offer ex-
piring on June 8 was a "purchase" within the meaning of the
statute, the Court had to decide whether a "sale" had also oc-
28. Traditionally, courts have held that the time at which an in-
sider's rights and obligations became fixed is the controlling event in
the application of section 16(b). Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,
232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); Blau v. Ogs-
bury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954).
29. See, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970);
Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 961 (1965); Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
30. In Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), there
was an agreement entered into in 1959 in connection with a reorganiza-
tion to issue "contingent shares" based upon a guarantee of the market
price of the stock of the acquiring corporation in 1962. The court con-
ceded that the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the
exchange of the stock became fixed in 1959 but held that the date of
purchase of the contingent shares for the purposes of section 16(b) was
the date of their delivery in 1962 because the price at which the stock
was to be purchased was to be determined by the market price at the
time of delivery. The court intimated that it selected this date because
the possibility of speculative abuse existed in the transaction.
31. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S.
589, 594-95 (1973). The Court stated:
In deciding whether borderline transactions are within the
reach of the statute, the courts have come to inquire whether
the transaction may serve as a vehicle for the evil which Con-
gress sought to prevent-the realization of short-swing profits
based upon access to insider information-thereby endeavoring
to implement congressional objectives without extending the




curred within six months. More specifically, the issue of lia-
bility turned on whether a "sale" took place when the merger
agreement was signed on August 30 (thus binding Occidental
to exchange its shares of Old Kern) or when Occidental gave
Tenneco an option on June 2 to purchase the stock Occidental
would receive if a merger were effectuated. Initially the Court
examined Occidental's acquisition of stock through its tender
offer and concluded that there was no possibility of access to
inside information at the time Occidental irrevocably commit-
ted itself to the tender offer since it then owned far less than
10 percent of the outstanding shares. 8 2  In like manner the
Court rejected the argument that Occidental knew that its ten-
der offer would either precede or force a defensive merger en-
abling Occidental to sell its stock at a substantial profit. The
Court reasoned that such calculations "do not represent the
kind of speculative abuse at which the statute is aimed, for
they could not have been based on inside information obtained
from substantial stockholdings that did not yet exist.188 Fur-
thermore, the possibility that Occidental had any confidential
information seemed extremely remote to the Court in light of
the vigorous and immediate opposition it encountered in its
takeover efforts.
Thus, finding no possibility of speculative abuse in Occi-
dental's purchase of the stock, the Court proceeded to deter-
mine whether any of Occidental's subsequent transactions con-
situted a sale. The critical factor in the Court's determination
that the exchange of shares required by the merger agreement
was not a sale by Occidental was that Occidental had neither
"engineered" nor participated in the merger agreement. 84 Sig-
32. Id. at 596-97. The Court stated:
It cannot be contended that Occidental was an insider when,
on May 8, 1967, it made an irrevocable offer to purchase 500,000
shares of Old Kern stock at a price substantially above market.
At the time, it owned only 1,900 shares of Old Kern stock, far
fewer than the 432,000 shares needed to constitute the 10%
ownership required by the statute. There is no basis for finding
that, at the time the tender offer was commenced, Occidental
enjoyed an insider's opportunity to acquire information about
Old Kern's affairs.
Id.
33. Id. at 597.
34. Id. at 599. The Court said:
The critical fact is that the exchange took place and was re-
quired pursuant to a merger between Old Kern and Tenneco.
That merger was not engineered by Occidental but was sought
by Old Kern to frustrate the attempts of Occidental to gain
control of Old Kern. Occidental obviously did not participate
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nificant to this determination were the findings that Occidental
refrained -rom voting at the shareholders' meeting where ap-
proval of the merger was obtained and that Occidental's deal-
ing in Old Kern stock had been fully disclosed before the vote.
The Court reasoned that once the merger agreement was ap-
proved, Occidental had no choice but to exchange its shares both
because there was no right of appraisal for dissenters 35 and
because a sale' of its stock before the merger was closed would
clearly have been a statutory sale. The combination of the "in-
voluntary" nature of the exchange and the "absence of the pos-
sibility of speculative abuse of inside information" convinced
the Court that the exchange of shares did not constitute a
sale.36
The Court then discussed whether the execution of the op-
tion agreement should itself be considered a sale. After stat-
ing that the mere execution of an option to sell was not gen-
erally -egarded as a "sale," the Court intimated that if a possi-
bility of speculative abuse existed in the execution of the op-
tion agreement, it would be held to be a "sale" within the
meaning of section 16(b). 37 The Court discounted the possibil-
ity of such an abuse in Kern because of the apparent mutual
advantages of the arrangement. If the option were exercised,
Occidental would be able to divest itself of a substantial invest-
ment in a company over which it would have no control, and
Tenneco would free'itself of a potentially troublesome minor-
ity stockholder.3 8 The Court said that "[m.]otivations like
these do not smack of insider trading."39 Moreover, it was un-
likely that Occidental was acting on the basis of inside infor-
mation related to the new stock since it was a statutory in-
in or control the negotiations or the agreement between Old
Kern and Tenneco.
Id.
35. Id. at 600.
36. Id. The Court noted that "Occidental could... have disposed
of its shares of Old Kern for cash before the merger was closed. Such
an act wouldhave been a § 16 (b) sale and would have left Occidental
with a prima facie § 16 (b) liability." Id.
37. Id. at 601. The Court stated that it could "not find in the
execution of the ... option agreement a sufficient possibility for the
speculative abuse of inside information with respect to Old Kern's af-
fairs to warrant holding that the option agreement was itself a 'sale'
within the meaning of § 16(b)." Id. The Court thereby implied that





sider of Old Kern rather than of Tenneco. The Court found
the possibility of speculative abuse further minimized by the
fact that Occidental had granted a "call" option 40 at a set
price which Tenneco could choose not to exercise if the market
price fell. If, on the other hand, the market price were to rise,
Tenneco alone would benefit. The Court did not indicate that
the premium paid for the option was so large "as to make the
exercise of the option almost inevitable" 41 nor did it find the
existence of other special circumstances, such as surrender of
the "emoluments of ownership," 42 to indicate that the parties
"understood and intended that the option was in fact a sale. ' 48
Thus, as the option was neither an instrument with potential
for speculative abuse nor one with the traditional indicia of a
sale, no sale could take place until the date of the option's exer-
cise.
Clearly favoring the objective test, the dissent 44 criticized
the individualized nature of the majority's analysis, especi-
ally the emphasis on "the economics of the particular transac-
tion and the modus operandi" of the particular insider as a
basis for deciding whether there existed the possibility of spec-
ulative abuse of inside information.45 Under an objective an-
alysis, the "round trip"40 taken by Occidental's shares was
40. Id. at 602. Tenneco had the right to buy after six months,
but Occidental could not force Tenneco to buy. See generally H. FMim,
UNDERSTANDING PUT An CALL OPTIoNs 96-111 (1959); G. LEFFLmr, T im
STocKc AI mr 363-78 (2d ed. 1957); Michaely & Lee, Put and Call
Options: Criteia for Applicability of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 40 Nomr DAME LAW. 239, 240-41 (1965); Note,
Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act,
69 YALE L.J. 868 (1960).
41. 411 U.S. at 603.
42. Id. at 604. In Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 698 (7th
Cir. 1970), the court noted the special circumstances upon which it based
its decision that "the stock was effectively transferred, for all practical
purposes, long before the exercise of the option." The court thought
that the size of the option price, 14 percent of the total purchase price
of the stock, suggested it was more of a down payment. The stock
had also been endorsed in blank and transferred to an escrow agent
pending completion of the transaction. In addition, an irrevocable
proxy to vote the shares was given to the optioner, and the former
owner of the shares and one of his associates resigned as directors and
were replaced by delegates of the optioner.
43. 411 U.S. at 604.
44. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr.
Justice Stewart concurred, dissented. Id. at 605 (dissenting opinion).
45. Id. at 612 (dissenting opinion).
46. Id. at 606 (dissenting opinion). The dissent concluded "that
Occidental . . . purchased and sold shares of Kern . . . within a six-
month period and that this 'round trip' in Old Kern stock is covered
by the literal terms of § 16 (b)." Id.
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covered by the literal language of the statute. The subjective
test, moreover, had been developed in conversion cases under
16(b) before conversions were exempted, and the reasoning of
such cases is not necessarily appropriate for cases involving
other types of transactions. The dissent seemed to believe that
the option agreement was in fact a sale and that at the very
least the case should have been remanded to the district court
for a hearing on whether the terms of the option "com-
pelled!'47 its exercise. Since there were insufficient facts to
permit the court of appeals to enter a summary judgment in
favor of Occidental, such a remand would be a more appropriate
method of handling the issue. Specifically, the dissent questioned
whether the premium paid for the option was not so high48 as
to make the exercise of the option inevitable (the premium was
to be credited against the purchase price or forfeited if the option
was not exercised).
Had the Court applied the subjective test in the traditional
manner, it would have reached a contrary decision. An analy-
sis of the facts of Kern indicates that it was at least possible
that inside information could have been used by the respond-
ent to its advantage if such information were in its posses-
sion.49 For example, after Occidental had become a 10 per-
cent beneficial owner of Kern stock by means of its initial ten-
der offer of May 8, knowledge that Kern would definitely
merge with Tenneco would have allowed Occidental to extend
47. Id. at 617 (dissenting opinion).
48. In Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1970),
discussed in note 42 supra, the court concluded that a purchase price
for an option which amounted to 14 percent of the exercise price of
the stock appeared to render the ultimate completion of the sale a fore-
gone conclusion because of the magnitude of the price. In Kern, the
purchase price of the option amounted to 9.5 percent of the exercise
price of the stock. See 411 U.S. at 615. The dissent also took note
of the fact that Occidental had authorized its attorney to vote its shares
in favor of the merger. Id. at 616.
49. Almost always negotiated in secrecy and accompanied by rising
stock prices, such transactions appear to present substantial opportuni-
ties for abuse. Occidental could have used confidential information re-
garding either the identity of the merger candidate or the method by
which the acquisition was to take place to time its trading of the shares
to maximize profits. Indeed, one article has gone so far as to state:
"A merger or consolidation, perhaps more than any other transaction,
involves many opportunities for abuse of confidential information."
Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act,
66 HEav. L. REv. 385, 626 (1953). For further discussion of the possibili-
ties of section 16(b) inherent in merger transactions see Hemmer, In-
sider Liability for Short-Swing Profits Pursuant to Mergers and Related
Transactions, 22 VAw L. 1tv. 1101, 1111-13 (1969).
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its tender offer, as it did on May 11, knowing full well that a
substantial profit would result from the sale of the stock after
the merger took place. 50 Although there was thus the pos-
sibility of speculative abuse which might have compelled a
different result under the subjective test as traditionally ap-
plied, the Court had two reasons for deciding Kern as it did.
First, the Court was once more faced with the problem of
determining whether a transaction which only arguably falls
within the purview of the statute should result in the imposi-
tion of section 16(b) liability. However, Kern presented the
Court with a situation that was manifestly different from those
in prior cases wherein the subjective test had been applied.
In those cases, the defendants exchanged shares by voluntarily
exercising an option to convert, otherwise took affirmative ac-
tion to effect the exchange, or controlled the exchange.5'
Occidental, on the other hand, neither had any control over the
exchange nor took affirmative action to bring it about.r2 It
appears that this factor (Occidental's total lack of any control
over the crucial event upon which the imposition of liability
50. It seems apparent that in all mergers the sum is different
from the total of the parts. The combination of two like companies
will amost always result in lower costs, and generally it can be pre-
sumed the new company will be more efficient. Therefore, inside infor-
mation about the occurrence of a merger as well as the identity of the
companies about to merge will allow a person to benefit from specula-
tion in the stock of the disappearing company because most investors
will assume such a combination will be a success, thereby forcing the
price of the stock upwards. This is not to say that all combinations
are ultimately successful.
51. It is not surprising that many of the cases decided before Kern
failed to make an inquiry before applying the possibility-of-speculative-
abuse test. In each case, the acquisition or disposition of the securities
took place as a result of the defendant's own act, and it was obvious
that the exchange had the indicia of a sale or a purchase. The cases
include situations wherein defendant converted his shares because the
failure to do so would have resulted in great economic loss. Although
one could classify such conversions as forced, the defendant nevertheless
had actual control over the transaction. Other cases involved exchanges
of stock pursuant to a merger where the defendant controlled the con-
summation of the merger or exchanges by an insider corporation of
its assets for the acquiring corporation's stock. The common thread
which runs through all these cases is that in each case the defendant
performed an affirmative act to effect a transaction which would not
have occurred without such act and thereby exercised control over the
crucial event which resulted in the imposition of liability. See Note,
Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate Consolidation: A Section 16(b)
"Purchase or Sale"?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1034, 1035 nn.9-12 (1969), and
cases cited therein.
52. 411 U.S. at 599,
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depended) was responsible for the apparent dilemma faced by
the Court: it could either apply the traditional subjective test
and impose liability upon a person who could do nothing to
avoid it, or it could compromise the test.
Second, the policy implications of a contrary decision
would have been most undesirable. It would give rise to a sit-
uation where the liability of one person would be totally de-
pendent upon the actions of another. The person who con-
trolled the closing of the merger would have the ability to
subject the holder of securities to section 16(b) liability when-
ever he so desired within the six-month period. Furthermore,
such a decision would result in the imposition of a handicap
upon the tender offeror in his quest for control.53 Therefore,
it seems that the Court decided the exchange issue on "equi-
table" grounds but supported its decision by compromising the
subjective test.
Under the compromised subjective test it appears the Court
must ask whether there was any possibility that the transac-
tion at issue did lead to speculative abuse rather than wheth-
er the transaction possibly could have lent itself to speculative
abuse.54 It would seem that henceforth a plaintiff may have
to introduce some evidence of actual abuse tending to show
that abuse of an inside position is not only possible, but proba-
ble. To require such a showing, however, would seriously un-
dermine the effectiveness of section 16 (b).55
53. To hold respondent liable for its profits under the circum-
stances of this case would permit the target company to offer a substan-
tial section 16 (b) liability to prospective partners seeking to defeat a
tender offer by means of a defensive merger. This result would increase
the number of offers which the target company could accept to defeat the
takeover bid because the recovery of profits under section 16 (b) would
act to equalize some of the inferior offers with that of the tender offeror.
The success of mergers has not been consistent in all instances. Ken-
nedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus. LAw. 1091 (1968). Therefore, the policy
to pursue should be one which keeps the takeover bidder and the target
company on an equal footing.
54. The Court reached a determination that it was "totally unre-
alistic to assume or infer from the facts before us that Occidental either
had or was likely to have access to inside information." 411 U.S. at
596. However, under the traditional possibility-of-speculative-abuse test
such a finding would be irrelevant. The only pertinent determination
would be that the transaction at issue could not possibly lend itself
to speculative abuse. Such a determination would be made by an ob-jective analysis of the facts of the exchange, disregarding what actually
transpired with respect to the party involved in the litigation.
55. If a showing of actual abuse is to be incorporated through this
compromised version of the possibility-of-speculative-abuse test, the dif-
ficulties of proof which section 16(b) was designed to alleviate will be
1974]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In order to maintain the effectiveness of section 16(b) and
at the same time prevent its harsh consequences in situations
such as that in Kern, the application of the possibility-of-specu-
lative-abuse test should be predicated upon a finding that the
transaction at issue can "reasonably be defined" as a sale or a pur-
chase. In other words, a court should first make an inquiry
to ascertain whether the transaction has the indicia of a sale
or a purchase. Then, if the court determines that such indicia
exist, the possibility-of-speculative-abuse test could be applied
in the traditional manner.
The standard for decision first set forth by the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Ferraiolo v. Newman56 seems to favor such a mode of
implementation of section 16(b). That standard appears to limit
the inquiry regarding the possibility of abuse to "transaction [s]
which can reasonably be defined as a purchase."57  The
court in Ferraiolo considered whether the indicia of a purchase
existed in the stock conversion before it, implying that such an
inquiry is necessary before liability can be imposed.58 Even
stronger support is found in another case which used the stand-
ard set forth in Ferraiolo to reach its decision. In Petteys
v. Butler59 the Eighth Circuit stated: "If no purpose is served
by attaching the artificial label of 'purchase' to a transaction
when it has none of the common indicia of a purchase, no such
label is demanded, nor will one be attached."'0
Kern provided the Court with an ideal opportunity to
evaluate a transaction and decide that it could not "reasonably
be defined" as a "sale" under section 16(b), since no previous
case had suggested that a transaction controlled exclusively by
others and giving a defendant no option not to participate
could be labeled as a "sale." A determination by the Court
that the transaction could not reasonably be defined as a sale
would have foreclosed all further inquiry into the exchange,
and it would not have been necessary to compromise the possi-
bility-of-speculative-abuse test to reach the desired result.
reintroduced. The increased complexity of section 16(b) trials, which
would result from inquiring into the activities of the specific party in-
volved in the litigation, would weaken the deterrent value of the statute.
Under such a case-by-case analysis litigation would likely increase,
fewer cases would be settled and insider short-swing speculation might
become more prevalent.
56. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
57. Id. at 345.
58. Id. at 346. See discussion in note 24 supra.
59. 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
60. Id. at 536.
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This mode of implementation of section 16(b) would pre-
vent liability from being imposed in any instance where an ac-
quisition or disposal of securities is completely uncontrollable
by the holder.61 Furthermore, it would allow increased judi-
cial flexibility in the application of the possibility-of-specula-
tive-abuse test to the even more complex exchanges of securi-
ties which are sure to come in the future. Most importantly,
this mode of implementation would allow the courts to focus on
a transaction as a member of a larger class of transactions
without the risk of working an unjust hardship on a particular
defendant. Such an approach would reduce litigation and
maximize the deterrent effect of section 16(b) by clarifying
which classes of transactions would be considered as having
the indicia of a purchase or sale. 2
The Court's treatment of the option agreement contributed
some desirable clarification with respect to the problem of deter-
mining what kind of an option agreement will immunize a bene-
ficial owner from section 16 (b) liability.63 Based on the Court's
approach in Kern, attention should be directed to a determination
of whether an option agreement is in fact a subterfuge rather than
upon an examination of the form of the transaction.0 4 Kern's
sanction of the subjective test, which had been applied by a few
61. Unless of course there existed proof of actual wrongdoing by
the holder. This would bring the fact situation within the purview of
rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), and liability would be imposed
accordingly.
62. Although the possibility-of-speculative-abuse test fails to main-
tain the total objectivity of an all-inclusive interpretation of section 16
(b), it nevertheless avoids the subjectivity necessarily incident to an in-
quiry into such questions as whether inside information was actually
abused or whether the insider intended to buy or sell on the short swing.
63. The Court's treatment of the option agreement, however, seems
inconsistent with the bifurcated approach to the subjective test sug-
gested in text following note 55 supra. As the Court initially deter-
mined that the execution of an option generally did not have the indicia
of a sale, a further inquiry into the possibility of speculative abuse
would be foreclosed under the suggested approach. See text accom-
panying note 37 supra. A course more consistent with the suggested
approach would have been the dissent's remand to the district court
for a further hearing on whether the terms of the option agreement
could compel its characterization as a sale. Such a hearing presumably
would have allowed the court to focus on the option agreement as a
member of a larger class of such agreements and would have supple-
mented the lore on whether such agreements have the indicia of a sale.
See text accompanying note 47 supra.
64. The Court stated that the "resolution of the question is very




lower federal courts previously,"" insures its universal application
to option agreements hereafter. This approach appears to be
consistent with the underlying policy of section 16 (b) because its
primary focus is on the defendant's ability to control or arrange
the outcome of events to its own advantage. More significant
than the Court's indorsement of the subjective test, however, was
its emphasis on the "mutual advantages of the arrangement"
as a criterion in determining whether an option agreement
smacks of insider trading.6 6 The Court intimated that the size
of the option price in relation to that of the exercise price, as well
as other objective criteria, must be considered in light of the
relative bargaining positions of the parties before a decision
as to liability can be made. This approach allows the courts
maximum flexibility in resolving the section 16(b) liability is-
sue regarding option agreements.
The decision in Kern will probably be given a narrow in-
terpretation by lower federal courts when applying the subject-
tive test to the exchange of stock. To allow Kern's compromised
version of the subjective test to apply to analogous situations
involving officers and directors would seem to be in direct con-
tradiction to the legislative history of section 16(b). The
Court's approach to the option agreement in Kern will undoubt-
edly cause a consideration of mutual advantage to be added to the
traditional criteria used in applying section 16 (b) liability to
such arrangements.
65. See cases cited at note 29 supra.
66. The Court noted:
The mutual advantages of the arrangement appear quite clear.
As the District Court found, Occidental wanted to avoid the
position of a minority stockholder with a huge investment in
a company over which it had no control and in which it had
not chosen to invest. On the other hand, Tenneco did not want
a potentially troublesome minority stockholder that had just
been vanquished in a fight for the control of Old Kern.
411 U.S. at 601.
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